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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- # # Copyright 2021 Google LLC. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. # You may obtain a copy of the License at # # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 # # Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software # distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, # WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. """Sign a user input file using a MAC signing key.""" from apitools.base.py import exceptions as apitools_exceptions from googlecloudsdk.api_lib.cloudkms import base as cloudkms_base from googlecloudsdk.calliope import base from googlecloudsdk.calliope import exceptions from googlecloudsdk.command_lib.kms import crc32c from googlecloudsdk.command_lib.kms import e2e_integrity from googlecloudsdk.command_lib.kms import flags from googlecloudsdk.core import log from googlecloudsdk.core.console import console_io from googlecloudsdk.core.util import files class MacSign(base.Command): r"""Sign a user input file using a MAC key version. Creates a digital signature of the input file using the provided MAC signing key version and saves the base64 encoded signature. The required flag `signature-file` indicates the path to store signature. By default, the command performs integrity verification on data sent to and received from Cloud KMS. Use --skip-integrity-verification to disable integrity verification. ## EXAMPLES The following command will read the file '/tmp/my/file.to.sign', and sign it using the symmetric MAC CryptoKey `dont-panic` Version 3, and save the signature in base64 format to '/tmp/my/signature'. $ {command} \ --location=us-central1 \ --keyring=hitchhiker \ --key=dont-panic \ --version=3 \ --input-file=/tmp/my/file.to.sign \ --signature-file=/tmp/my/signature """ @staticmethod def Args(parser): flags.AddKeyResourceFlags(parser, 'to use for signing.') flags.AddCryptoKeyVersionFlag(parser, 'to use for signing') flags.AddInputFileFlag(parser, 'to sign') flags.AddSignatureFileFlag(parser, 'to output') flags.AddSkipIntegrityVerification(parser) def _ReadFileOrStdin(self, path, max_bytes): data = console_io.ReadFromFileOrStdin(path, binary=True) if len(data) > max_bytes: raise exceptions.BadFileException( 'The file [{0}] is larger than the maximum size of {1} bytes.'.format( path, max_bytes)) return data def _PerformIntegrityVerification(self, args): return not args.skip_integrity_verification def _CreateMacSignRequest(self, args): try: # The MacSign API limits the input data to 64KiB. data = self._ReadFileOrStdin(args.input_file, max_bytes=65536) except EnvironmentError as e: raise exceptions.BadFileException( 'Failed to read input file [{0}]: {1}'.format(args.input_file, e)) messages = cloudkms_base.GetMessagesModule() req = messages.CloudkmsProjectsLocationsKeyRingsCryptoKeysCryptoKeyVersionsMacSignRequest( # pylint: disable=line-too-long name=flags.ParseCryptoKeyVersionName(args).RelativeName()) if self._PerformIntegrityVerification(args): data_crc32c = crc32c.Crc32c(data) req.macSignRequest = messages.MacSignRequest( data=data, dataCrc32c=data_crc32c) else: req.macSignRequest = messages.MacSignRequest(data=data) return req def _VerifyResponseIntegrityFields(self, req, resp): """Verifies integrity fields in MacSignResponse.""" # Verify resource name. if req.name != resp.name: raise e2e_integrity.ResourceNameVerificationError( e2e_integrity.GetResourceNameMismatchErrorMessage( req.name, resp.name)) # data_crc32c was verified server-side. if not resp.verifiedDataCrc32c: raise e2e_integrity.ClientSideIntegrityVerificationError( e2e_integrity.GetRequestToServerCorruptedErrorMessage()) # Verify mac checksum. if not crc32c.Crc32cMatches(resp.mac, resp.macCrc32c): raise e2e_integrity.ClientSideIntegrityVerificationError( e2e_integrity.GetResponseFromServerCorruptedErrorMessage()) def Run(self, args): client = cloudkms_base.GetClientInstance() req = self._CreateMacSignRequest(args) try: resp = ( client.projects_locations_keyRings_cryptoKeys_cryptoKeyVersions .MacSign(req)) # Intercept INVALID_ARGUMENT errors related to checksum verification, to # present a user-friendly message. All other errors are surfaced as-is. except apitools_exceptions.HttpBadRequestError as error: e2e_integrity.ProcessHttpBadRequestError(error) if self._PerformIntegrityVerification(args): self._VerifyResponseIntegrityFields(req, resp) try: log.WriteToFileOrStdout( args.signature_file, resp.mac, overwrite=True, binary=True, private=True) except files.Error as e: raise exceptions.BadFileException(e)